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Recent Cases
PROPERTY-ESTATES BY THE EtnRrY IN JoIwr BANK AccouNT
Collum v. Rice-
Plaintiff, judgment creditor of H, brought a garnishment action to reach the
undivided interest of H in a deposit, standing in the name of H and W, with
garnishee bank. From judgment of the trial court discharging garnishee, plaintiff
appealed. Held: Affirmed. The Married Woman's Property Act does not prevent
the creation of a tenancy by the entirety, which arises wherever a joint estate is
created in husband and wife. An estate by the entirety may not be reached by
the individual creditors of either spouse.
At common law a married woman could under no circumstances establish a
separate legal domicile.2 She was subject to reasonable control over her person
and restraints on her liberty,3 probably to moderate chastisement,, by her husband.
He was absolutely entitled to her services and her earnings.5 She could not sue
or be sued separately, no matter how personal to her the cause of action, but her
husband, must be joined as co-plaintiff or defendant, as the case might be.6 Her
attempts at contract were altogether void. With the exception of wearing apparel
and articles of personal adornment, her chattels in possession-whether owned
by her before marriage or acquired during coverture-became the absolute property
of her husband immediately. Her choses in action became his when reduced to
possession.7 The system of tenures intervened to prevent the complete destruction
of the wife's interest in freehold estates and her husband was only entitled to the
usufruct and management during coverture, and to a life estate by curtesy, there
having been born alive issue capable of inheriting the estate.8 There was no possi-
bility of terminating the marital relationship by judicial divorce.9
It is usually said that the rules just stated were founded on the ecclesiastical
concept of the merger of personalities in the marriage sacrament, and reflect the
influence of the Church of England, which was accorded exclusive jurisdiction in
matters matrimonial as well as testamentary. It should not be overlooked, how-
ever, that concentration in a single person of authority over, and correlative
1. 162 S. W. (2d) 342 (Mo. App. 1942).
2. See Beale, The Domicil of a Married Womn (1917) 2 So. L. Q. 93.
3. 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES *181.
4. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *445.
5. See WARREN, Husband's Right to Wife's Services (1925) 38 HARv. L.
Rrv. 421, 622.
6. MADDEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1931) § 54.
7. Co. Lrrr. "351b; 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES *135, 143.
8. Co. LiTr. *29a, 351a; 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *126.
9. MADDEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1931) § 81.
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responsibility for, all the members of the family unit was really an extension of the
principles of social organization upon which the entire feudal society was based.
It is immediately apparent that there was limited opportunity for co-tenancy
in any kind of property between husband and wife. Co-tenancy requires a con-
tinuing legal interest in both tenants, impossible where the husband had exclusive
title to chattels.'o Tenancies in common in real property were possible, as the
wife's undivided half interest remained her property, though subject to the hus-
band's control and enjoyment. But where it was attempted to create a joint
estate in husband and wife-and the common law favored the interpretation of
a conveyance to co-tenants as creating a joint tenancy where possible, so that the
characteristic right of survivorship might minimize disturbance of the existing
feudal relation-additional problems were encountered. Single persons who hold
in joint tenancy may destroy the character of their ownership by agreement, or by
the conveyance to a third person of the interest of any co-tenant (destroying the
essential unities of time and title), but this was obviously impossible for a married
woman to do and undesirable for her husband to be able to do, as it would affect
the character of her interest which she was powerless to protect. So a conveyance
which would, as between single "grantees," create a joint tenancy, was held to
create a tenancy by the entirety in husband and wife, but it is noteworthy that
neither Littleton, Coke nor Blackstone refer to a tenancy by the entirety in those
words. The only substantial difference was (and is) that the latter could not be
altered by conveyance of either party, and as the creditors of one spouse could
exercise no greater right than their debtor, they could not force a sale of an un-
divided half interest to satisfy their claims. The traditional rationalization of
tenancies by the entireties, that husband and wife are seised per tout et non per 'My
because they are in legal contemplation but one person and there can be but one
estate, must have been unsatisfying even when religious metaphysics was accepted
legal doctrine, for the merger of personalities did not prevent tenancies in common
nor affect the character of a joint estate created in a man and woman before their
marriage."' With the enactment of the Married Women's Property Acts there is
no longer any obstacle to co-tenancy in personal property by husband and wife.' 2
Neither, however, is there any reason for changing a joint tenancy, either in per-
sonal or real property, into a tenancy by the entirety; i.e., for denying its de-
structibility as between husband and wife. But by the great weight of authority
the statutes have not prevented estates by the entireties in real13 or personal1
10. Polk's Adm'r. v. Allen, 19 Mo. 467 (1854).
11. 2 Co. Lrrr. *187b; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 431.
12. Cases are collected in Notes (1920) 8 A. L. R. 1017 and (1938) 117
A. L. R. 915.
13. In Bains v. Bullock, 129 Mo. 117, 31 S. W. 342 (1895), the court said,
"the statute abolishes the legal unity between husband and wife, which gave rise
to estates by the entirety, but the estate itself has not been abolished." Ratio est
legis alma; inutata legis ratione inutatur et lex!
For other cases, see 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 433.
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property. There is substantial dissent In the principal case the court, without
extended discussion of the fundamental questions involved, relied entirely on dis-
tinguishable precedent relating to real property. To hold that a statute does not
by implication destroy a settled common law doctrine is one thing; to extend that
doctrine to situations which prior to the very statute could not have been em-
braced within it is quite another. Moreover, the possibility of estates by the
entireties in real estate is expressly recognised by one Missouri statute 5 and the
exception in favor of husband and wife in the statute 6 abolishing the common law
presumption of joint tenancy in conveyances of real estate perhaps inferentially
suggests the same recognition.
The court could have cited a respectable group of Missouri cases asserting the
existence of a tenancy by the entirety in chattels and choses in action.17 However,
the issue in every case was that of survivorship, so that a holding of joint tenancy
would have reached the same result Of these authorities the only one'8 containing
any analytical consideration of the question directed inquiry solely to the issue of
whether co-tenancy, and specifically joint tenancy, in chattels was possible between
husband and wife, and having rightly concluded joint tenancy could exist, there-
after gratuitously spoke the language of tenancies by the entireties. Reliance was
placed in part upon Shields v. Stillman,'9 where the court merely held that a
promissory note payable to husband and wife became the exclusive property of the
survivor, without considering or mentioning an estate by the entirety.
In the principal case the court cavalierly passed over such vexing factors as
the original ownership of the money deposited or of the right of withdrawal by
either party. If the husband made a joint deposit of his wife's money, without
her written agreement, there is neither joint estate nor estate by the entirety but a
resulting trust in her favor.20 By Missouri statute a deposit in the name of the
14. See cases collected in Notes (1920) 8 A. L. R. 1017 and (1938) 117
A. L. R. 915.
15. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 3402.
16. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 3504. The statute is noted in (1940) 5 Mo. L.
REV. 114.
17. Johnston v. Johnston, 173 Mo. 91, 73 S. W. 202 (1903); Frost v. Frost,
200 Mo. 474, 98 S. W. 527 (1906); Ryan v. Ford, 151 Mo. App. 689, 132 S. W.
610 (1910); Craig v. Bradley, 153 Mo. App. 586, 134 S. W. 1081 (1911); Rezabek
v. Rezabek, 196 Mo. App. 673, 192 S. W. 107 (1917); In re Estate of'Greenwood,
201 Mo. App. 39, 208 S. W. 635 (1919); Lomax v. Cramer, 216 S. W. 575 (1919);
Yates v. Richmond Trust Co., 220 S. W. 692 (1920); Zahner v. Voelker, 11 S. W.
(2d) 63 (1928).
18. Johnston v. Johnston, 173 Mo. 91, 73 S. W. 202 (1903).
19. 48 Mo. 82 (1871). So, in Murphy v. Wolfe, 329 Mo. 545, 45 S. W. (2d)
1079 (1932) the court sustained the right of the surviving husband to the joint bank
deposit on the ground of joint estate, without the unnecessary mention of an estate
by the entirety.
20. This is the consequence of the peculiar wording of the Missouri version
of the Married Woman's Property Act (Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 3390) whereby
personal property reduced by the husband to his possession with her written consent
becomes his absolute property (so that he can thereafter use it as consideration
19431
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"depositor and another person and in form to be paid to either, or the survivor
of them" becomes "the property of such persons as joint tenants,"21 but to come
within its scope the deposit must be explicitly "in form to be paid to either or the
survivor of them."22 Apart from the statute grave doubt may be expressed as to
whether a true joint tenancy may exist if the account is payable to either depositor
alone. It has been sustained-as a form of mutual agency without surrender of right
of possession.23 Certainly it is highly inconsistent with the fundamental concept
of the indestructibility of a tenancy by the entirety24 and to recognize in one
spouse the power to withdraw any or all of the deposit, spend it in his discretion
and hold the proceeds free from any, claim of undivided interest in the other spouse,
which our supreme court will sanction upon adequate proof,25 and yet to hold, as
was done in the principal case, that the creditors of the husband might not reach
the deposit in the bank, is to perpetrate a virtual fraud on creditors.
The whole doctrine of "untouchability" of estates by the entireties 20 is a form
of judicial exemption, without limit in amount. Statutory exemptions protect
the public from the burden of supporting debtors stripped of their means of
livelihood, and are limited to assets sufficient to the purpose. Under Collum v.
Rice27 a husband and wife could maintain an account of $100,000 free from their
creditors, so long as it was not established by fraudulent conveyance. The argu-
ment applies equally to estates by the entireties in real property, but there was
surely little justification in extending the concept to chattels in an age where every
incident of the marital disability has been removed from the wife, either abso-
lutely or as far as consonant with preservation of the family as a going concern.
0. B. E.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-VIOLATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
Rodenkirck v. Nemnich'
This was an action for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff in an auto-
mobile accident. The collision resulted directly from the defendant's failure to stop
for a promise to pay jointly to himself and his wife) but not otherwise. The statute
does not prevent a married woman from making an outright gift to her husband
by simple delivery, or from contributing part or all of the money deposited in their
joint names. Murphy v. Wolfe, 329 Mo. 545, 45 S. W. (2d) 1079 (1932).
21. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§ 7996, 8070.
22. Murphy v. Wolfe, 329 Mo. 545, 45 S. W. (2d) 1079 (1932).
23. Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings and Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 200 At. 624
(1938).
24. Marble v. Jackson, State Treasurer, 245 Mass. 504, 139 N. E. 442 (1923);
Murphy v. Michigan Trust Co., 221 Mich. 243, 190 N. W. 698 (1922).
25. Ambruster v. Ambruster, 326 Mo. 51, 31 S. W. (2d) 28 (1930).
26. See Note (1941) 6 Mo. L. Rnv. 207.
27. The principal case.
1. Rodenkirch v. Nemnich, 168 S. NV. (2d) 977 (1943).
[Vol. 8
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in obedience to a stop sign located at the intersection where the accident occurred.
The Missouri State Highway Department erected this sign prior to the accident
in question, but there was no statute which requires persons to stop at this point
in obedience to the sign. Defendant's testimony tended to show that he had used
due care. But the court instructed the jury to the effect that a failure to observe
the stop sign in question was negligence as a matter of law. A verdict was returned
for the plaintiff, but the trial court sustained defendants motion for a new trial.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals affirmed the order sustaining the defendant's motion
for a new trial on the ground that the above instruction was erroneous. The State
Highway Department, by erecting such signs, cannot create a standard of conduct
the violation of which is negligence per se. Such violation is nothing more than
evidence of negligence.
The majority of our courts hold that if the injuries to a plaintiff in a civil
proceeding were proximately caused by the defendant's doing a prohibited act in
violation of an ordinance or statute designed to prevent injuries of the type con-
templated by the statute, and if the plaintiff was a member of that group which
the statute was designed to protect, then the defendant will be deemed to have
been negligent as a matter of law-that is, negligent per se.2 Few cases, however,
have given such effect to the violation of administrative orders, some cases even
going to the extent of holding that the violation of some such rules is not admissible
as evidence.3 But the weight of authority is that the violation of a rule or regu-
lation of a governmental commission or board, while not constituting negligence
per se may afford some evidence of negligence.' This apparent conflict of opinion
among some of our jurisdictions may be largely explained by considering the stat-
utory authorization of the board which issued the order, and the binding effect
which is given that order.
The cases which hold that the violation of an administrative regulation may
constitute negligence per se are cases which involve some unusual or special power
granted to that board by statute. The case of Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Moses,
Adm'r.5 held that the violation of an Interstate Commerce Commission rule con-
cerning headlights on trains was negligence per se. This holding was explained on
the ground that said rule of the Interstate Commerce Commission has an even
greater binding force and effect than an act of a state legislature. However, the
rules of governmental commissions do not generally have such significance.
The usual situation and the one on which the previously stated majority rule
is based, is that situation in which the legislature has conferred upon an admin-
istrative board the general powers to make regulations concerning a certain field.
2. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 286; Note (1928) 15 VA. L. REv. 166.
3. Parker v. Granger, 4 Cal. (2d) 668, 52 P. (2d) 226 (1935); Grant v.
Libby, McNeil & Libby, 160 Wash. 138, 295 Pac. 139 (1931).
4. 45 C. J. 732..
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The violation of such rules is generally held not to constitute negligence per se, but
may be admitted as evidence of negligence.6 This has been held to be the case
even where the legislature has declared that the administrative rules made under
such general authorization shall have the force and effect of law.7 Those states
which hold that the violation of a statute or ordinance does not constitute negli.
gence per se but is merely evidence of negligence give the same effect to the viola-
tion of a governmental regulation."
Where a government department or commission issues a regulation, such as a
safety code, merely for the informative value and not as a regulation having the
binding force of law, the courts usually have held that the violation of such regu-
lation is not admissible as evidence of negligence. 9 The states that take a different
view on these informative regulations hold that such violations may be admitted
as expert opinion evidence of negligence. 10
In the reported case the Missouri State Highway Department erected the stop
sign in accordance with a general authorization by the state legislature." The
court in the principal case, in holding that the failure to obey this ,stop sign had
the weight only of evidence of negligence, was acting in accordance with prevailing
authority.
HERBERT CAIN CASTEEL, JR.
6. Brumhall v. Sutherland, 110 Cal. App. 10, 293 Pac. 672 (1930); Roberts
v. Wilson, 33 S. W. (2d) 169 (Mo. App. 1930). Though no statute requires ob-
servance of stop signal at intersection, failure to obey signal may be found to con-
stitute common law negligence and is element for consideration by the jury. Ur-
sprung v. Winter Garden Co., 183 App. Div. 718, 169 N. Y. S. 738 (1918).
7. Schumer v. Caplin, 241 N. Y. 346, 150 N. E. 139 (1925). A legislative
declaration that a rule has the force and effect of law does not make it so, if by
that is meant that it- is the equivalent of or equal to a legislative enactment. Thus
the correct charge would have been that the violation of this rule did not establish
negligence per se, but was simply some evidence of negligence.
8. Beauvais v. Springfield Institute for Savings, 303 Mass. 136, 20 N. E. (2d)
957, 124 A. L. R. 611 (1939); Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 167 N. E.
235 (Mass. 1929). A violation of a statute, ordinance or regulation, although not
conclusive, is evidence of negligence on the part of a violator as to all consequences
that the statute,ordinance or regulation was intended to prevent.
9. Note (1939) 122 A. L. R. 644. Two reasons given for such exclusion are
1) that although safety codes may represent expert opinion, such opinions are
not given under oath, with an opportunity for cross-examination, and 2) that
they do not deal with an exact science in which opinions may change. It has been
held that the objection to the admission in evidence of safety rules promulgated by
a department of government was of the same nature as the objection to the ad-
mission of scientific treatises which may be obviated by the evidence of an expert
witness that such treatise or rules are esteemed by authority on the subject. Dothan
v. Hardy, 188 So. 264 (Ala. 1939).
10. City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264, 122 A. L. R. 637
(1939).
11. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 8755. The Commission is authorized to erect,
or cause to be erected, danger signals or warning signs at railroad crossings, high-
way intersections or other places along the state highways which the commission
deem to be dangerous.
[Vol. 8
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